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ABSTRACT 
 
Social Evaluations of 7- and 8-Month-Old Infants. (May 2012) 
Tyler Joshua Kasperbauer, B.A., Simpson College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Teresa Wilcox 
 
A landmark experiment by Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom 
demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months old possess previously unrecognized 
abilities to form social evaluations. In the experiment, infants were shown a shape that 
was made to appear as if it was climbing a hill. In one event, another shape helped the 
climber up the hill, while in a separate event, a different shape prevented the climber 
from reaching the top. When offered a choice between the helping and hindering shapes, 
both 6- and 10-month-olds chose the helping shape over the hindering shape, showing 
that they had evaluated the actions and preferred the helper as a result. In an additional 
test, the climber was made to appear as if it was “choosing” the helping shape or the 
hindering shape. Infant looking times were measured in order to assess which “choice” 
was more surprising. Interestingly, the 6-month-olds looked equally for both events, 
while the 10-month-olds looked longer when the hinderer was approached. This 
demonstrated that the 10-month-olds were attributing preferences to the climber, and 
expected that the climber would prefer the helper just as they had. This ability was 
apparently beyond that of the 6-month-olds, but no assessment or explanation has been 
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offered for why this would be. The current study attempted to remedy this problem by 
replicating this experiment with 7- and 8-month-olds.   
The 7-month-olds in this experiment performed as expected, preferring the helper 
over the hinderer. The 8-month-olds, however, showed no clear preference. This was 
unexpected and not easily explainable. Neither age showed a difference in looking time 
whether the climber approached the helper or the hinderer. These looking time data 
suggest that 7- and 8-month-olds are closer to 6-month-olds in their ability to attribute 
evaluations to other agents, indicating that these abilities do not develop until later 
infancy, around 9 or 10 months. However, lack of significant results on the looking time 
test need not indicate a lack of social knowledge, and may instead stem more directly 
from developing theory of mind abilities. Options for future studies pitting social 
knowledge against theory of mind are explored. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent experiments on social evaluations, infants as young as 6-months-old 
have been shown to prefer “helping” shapes over “hindering” shapes (Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; 
Wynn, 2008). In these experiments, infants are habituated to repeated sequences of a 
circle attempting to climb a hill, followed either by a square thwarting its efforts by 
pushing the circle down the hill or a triangle providing assistance by pushing the circle 
up the hill. The main results of Hamlin et al. (2007) showed that 6- and 10-month-olds, 
when given a choice between the helper and the hinderer, preferred the helping shape. 
An interesting age difference was found, however, in a looking time task. When the 
climbing shape, in a non-climbing setting, approached the hinderer instead of the helper, 
10-month-olds looked longer than when the shape approached the helper. This indicated 
that the 10-month-olds expected the climbing shape to have formed a preference for the 
helping agent, just as they had, and to act accordingly. The 6-month-olds, by contrast, 
did not show a difference in looking time, indicating that the actions of the climbing 
agent were not surprising to them. This is puzzling, as the 6-month-olds formed a 
preference for the helper just as the 10-month-olds had. Why would this be? Why would 
6- and 10-month-olds form divergent expectations of the climbing agent? 
 The current study attempts to answer these questions by assessing the response of 
7- and 8-month-olds to the social evaluation task from Hamlin et al. (2007). Variations  
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Developmental Psychology. 
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on Hamlin et al.’s (2007) methodology have been conducted with 3- and 4-month-olds  
(Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010), 5- and 12-month-olds (Kuhlmeier, Wynn, &  
Bloom, 2003) and 9- and 12-month-olds (Wynn, 2008), but never 7- and 8-month-olds. 
These other experiments have all consistently found an age difference between the 
choice test and the looking time test. Wynn (2008) furthermore reports that 9-month-olds 
express looking times similar to that of the 10-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2007). So 
although it is clear that at least by 6 months infants prefer the helper to the hinderer on 
the choice test, it has not yet been determined at what time between 6 months and 9 
months that infants begin to shift in the type of understanding measured by the looking 
time test. 
 The evaluations infants display in these experiments require sophisticated social 
knowledge previously unacknowledged in infants this young. This knowledge does not 
arise ex nihilo, however, and in fact relies upon many other psychological processes that 
develop throughout the first year of life. The first part of the introduction will outline 
other processes that determine social evaluations, such as the attribution of goals, 
intentions, and dispositions. These allow infants to understand how even basic shapes 
can be goal-oriented and act intentionally. This discussion will be followed by a more 
detailed analysis of social evaluation experiments and the development of moral 
psychology in infancy. Finally, a few words will be said about the role of novelty and 
familiarity in these experiments. Since the looking time task is key to explaining age 
differences in social evaluations, it is crucial that the results can be interpreted according 
to either a novelty effect or a familiarity effect. The violation of an expectation can 
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result from either. This debate must be adjudicated in order to determine the cause of age 
differences in social evaluations. 
Determinants of Social Evaluation 
 Even in their first year, human infants possess the ability to attribute intentions 
and action preferences to agents other than themselves. For instance, 5- and 6-month-
olds who see a human hand consistently reach for one of two objects (e.g., a bear and not 
a ball) expect that it will continue to reach for that same object (Woodward, 1998). Even 
if the ball and bear switch locations, infants still expect the hand to reach for the bear. 
This expectation does not arise, however, if the hand appears to engage the ball 
accidentally (Woodward, 1999, 2009). Infants as young as 3 months old will make 
similar attributions to even basic shapes when the shapes are made to appear 
autonomous and self-propelled. Infants who see an otherwise novel inanimate object 
move towards another object expect that this action tendency will persist across many 
different situations (Luo, 2010; as will 5-month-olds, Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; and 12-
month-olds, Shimizu & Johnson, 2004).  
 This assumption that action tendencies will remain consistent indicates that 
infants attribute dispositions to both objects and agents. Nine-and-a-half-month-olds, for 
example, will readily detect when somebody plays with toys in one particular way; say, 
by only sliding toy trucks on the ground. They then show surprise when that same 
person makes it impossible to persist in that style of play by selecting trucks that are not 
able to slide (Song & Baillargeon, 2007). This provides an important strategy for 
identifying objects: attributing dispositions allows infants to tie behaviors to objects such 
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that those behaviors identify what that object is and what it does. It furthermore allows 
infants to assume that other agents possess an understanding of how objects function and 
will use them appropriately.  
 This latter observation suggests that infants possess standards by which they 
judge other agents. A consistent finding in research on this topic is that infants assume 
that goals will be achieved with a certain degree of efficiency: 12-month-olds, for 
example, will attribute goals to animated shapes, and show surprise if those shapes try to 
reach goals by inefficient means (e.g., traveling in a curved line when a straight line 
would be faster) (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). Infants make note not only 
of the shape’s goal but also what would be the best strategy for achieving that goal. In an 
experiment by Hamlin, Newman, and Wynn (2009), 8-month-olds were shown a scene 
in which an adult performed actions with a ring and a cone, but evidence of the adult’s 
goal was ambiguous. They found that infants attempted to complete the task, assuming 
that the adult intended to place the ring on the cone. In both of these experiments infants 
attributed goals with very specific content that went beyond the evidence provided.  
 The standards infants use in their goal attributions occasionally result in social 
evaluations. Behne, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) demonstrated that 9-, 12-, 
and 18-month-olds (but not 6-month-olds) show more frustration when a toy is 
intentionally kept from them than when they are accidentally not given a toy (Marsh, 
Stavropoulos, Nienhuis, & Legerstee, 2010 observed frustration behaviors in 6-month-
olds as well, using more sensitive measures of frustration). Hart and Carrington (2002) 
found that 6-month-old infants show more jealousy when their caretakers respond 
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preferentially to a toy doll than when they respond preferentially toward a book. These 
experiments show that infants expect adults to treat them in a certain way, and get upset 
when adults do something they dislike. Thinking of these transgressions in relation to 
adults, we might say that someone making an intentional refusal is being mean. We are 
also more likely to become jealous over human competitors (or in this case a doll) than 
something inanimate. It appears that infants make similar judgments. Their ability to 
attribute goals to other agents allows them to recognize when someone possesses the 
intention to frustrate their own goals. In these experiments, this is expressed in the form 
of frustration and jealousy, but we might wonder how else this behavior could be 
characterized. 
 Researchers working on socio-emotional development in infancy have noted the 
tendency for infants to be more sensitive to negative information than positive 
information. Frustrated goals and jealousy are just a couple examples. This “negativity 
bias” in early development (Carver & Vaccaro, 2007; Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 
2008) can be seen in a variety of other studies, perhaps most notably in one of the first 
experiments on social evaluations. Premack and Premack (1997) claimed that negative 
information is highly significant for infants, but further reasoned that this hyper-
sensitivity to negative information should express itself with respect to positive 
information as well. For example, if infants view a goal as being bad in some way, 
presumably that entails that other goals are more positive. In their experiment, Premack 
and Premack, showed 13-month-olds animated events in which shapes either appeared to 
help other shapes achieve their goals (helping them move to parts of the display) or 
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hinder their goals (prohibiting them from moving to parts of the display). If infants saw 
the helper event followed by the hindering event, they showed surprise at the hindering 
event. The opposite effect was not observed, however; seeing the hindering event 
followed by the helper event failed to produce surprise to the helper event. This 
demonstrated that the helping event was thoroughly expected, while the hindering event 
was not. This supports the idea that negative information is more salient, apparently in 
virtue of infants’ assumption that helping behavior is expected. A weakness of this 
experiment, however, is that it remains difficult to see how infants are differentiating the 
value of the two events. It’s not clear, that is, whether increased surprise indicates that 
one action is seen as more positive than the other, or if instead violating expectations 
should be interpreted in a more minimal way. This is the problem space within which 
recent experiments on social evaluations have been conducted. 
 One objection that might be raised is that low-level evaluations, such as that 
studied by Premack and Premack, will be unable to provide insights into moral 
development (Jacob & Dupoux, 2008). Social evaluation abilities that develop in the 
first year are of course precursors to full-fledged adult morality, but it has traditionally 
been thought that the most interesting moral behaviors do not develop until later in 
infancy. For instance, a marked increased in “prosocial” behaviors (showing concern and 
offering assistance to others) is observed after the first year (Dunn, 1987), with a 
dramatic increase in such behaviors throughout the second year (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-
Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). The argument could be made that the behaviors of 
 7 
young infants are too different from that seen in the second year to provide insights into 
the development of morality. 
 In response, what experiments on infants in the first year can provide is an 
insight into how the attribution of goals, preferences, and dispositions are related to 
broader social evaluations. Infants may not be able to act prosocially, but they can show 
a preference for prosocial agents. They can understand when agents are frustrating their 
own goals, and, as Premack and Premack showed, evince surprise when agents frustrate 
others’ goals. Infants’ identification of whom they like and whom they think other 
people like is a significant component of early development (Platten, Hernik, Fonagy, & 
Pasco Fearon, 2010). As discussed in the next section, recent experiments have allowed 
researchers to expand upon the designs of Premack and Premack, as well as others, in 
order to test more precise questions about infants’ social knowledge in the first year of 
life.  
Social Evaluation 
 This section will briefly re-describe the original Hamlin et al. (2007) experiment 
in addition to discussing other experiments relevant to properly replicating and 
interpreting Hamlin et al. (2007). One early study of social evaluations that used 
potentially problematic methods of assessment (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003) will be discussed 
separately. This experiment, as well as a couple of others (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 
2010; Wynn, 2008), have used assessment measures that are slightly incommensurate 
with Hamlin et al. (2007) and require explanation apart from the general methodology of 
this replication. 
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 As described previously, the central task of Hamlin et al. (2007) consisted of a 
climbing event in which infants viewed one shape attempt to climb a hill. Infants then 
watched other shapes enter the scene in alternating trials, one that was ostensibly trying 
to help the shape complete its goal (to get to the top of the hill) and the other trying to 
prevent it from reaching its goal. Two different tests followed these climbing trials. One 
was a looking time measure, in which the climbing agent was shown in between the 
other two shapes and “chose” one by moving closer to it. This was intended to measure 
whether the infants attribute preferences to the circle and whether the circle’s actions 
surprised them. The second test was a choice task, in which the helper and hinderer 
shapes were presented to the infants side-by-side and the infants were given the chance 
to pick one. Six- and 10-month-olds diverged in their performance on the two tests. 
Although both 6- and 10-month-olds preferred the helper in the choice task, only 10-
month-olds showed evidence of surprise (measured by looking time) when the circle 
“chose” the hinderer. The 6-month-olds, that is, looked equally whether the circle 
approached the helper or the hinderer.  
 A couple details are important here. Multiple controls were included in this 
landmark experiment, the effectiveness of which serves to reduce the need to include 
them in the current study. First, other choice tests independently paired the helping and 
hindering agents with a neutral shape—one that climbed up and down the hill but did not 
interact with any other shape. Results showed that infants preferred the helper to the 
neutral agent and the neutral shape to the hinderer. This is crucial, as it demonstrates that 
the hinderer is in fact considered something to be avoided, not just that it is worse than 
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the helper. A second important detail is that a separate condition used the same events 
but a climber without eyes or self-propulsion. Eyes and self-propulsion are agency cues, 
or features that indicate that something is an agent and is capable of possessing goals. In 
this condition, infants did not show a preference for either the helper or the hinderer. 
This demonstrates that the agency cues are essential for the infants in attributing specific 
goals—that of helping and hindering—to otherwise normal shapes. That these were the 
only cues required to observe an effect is significant, as 6-month-olds generally need 
multiple cues in order to attribute goals (Biro & Leslie, 2007). 
 The basic methodology of Hamlin et al. (2007) has been replicated with infants 
as young as 3 months old. Due to their lack of motor skills, all test events with infants 
this young relied upon looking times instead of choices. Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 
(2010) showed 3-month-olds the exact same climbing events from Hamlin et al. (2007), 
followed by the same presentation of the helping and hindering agents. Instead of asking 
the infants to choose one, the researchers instead measured the amount of time spent 
looking at each agent. They found that the 3-month-olds looked longer at the helper, 
which they took to indicate that the infants preferred the helper. They also paired the 
helper and hinderer with a neutral agent in a separate choice task. The neutral agent 
either moved up or down the hill without making contact with the climber. This was 
meant to study whether the infants’ evaluations represented something more than a 
comparative preference for the helper (as in Hamlin et al., 2007). They found that 3-
month-olds looked longer at the helper than the neutral character, and longer at the 
 10 
neutral character than at the hinderer. This demonstrated that the infants not only liked 
the helper, but that they also disliked the hinderer.  
 Hamlin and Wynn (2011) conceptually replicated Hamlin et al.’s (2007) 
experiment, using different stimuli and events, with 5- and 9-month-olds. They first 
familiarized infants to a scene in which a puppet dog attempted but failed to open a box. 
Infants then saw one of two scenes: they either watched as another puppet entered the 
scene and opened the box all the way, or they saw a different puppet enter and jump on 
top of the box to slam it shut. Infants were then given a choice test similar to that used in 
the original climbing experiments (except these were of course puppets). Twenty-five of 
34 infants chose the helper over the hinderer, including 13 of 18 5-month-olds. 
Interestingly, in an inanimate condition, where the puppets were replaced by pincers, this 
preference was reversed. Though the results didn’t reach significance, 23 of 34 infants 
chose the hinderer over the helper, including 12 of 18 5-month-olds and 11 of 16 9-
month-olds. These pincer results are mentioned only because it is curious that infants 
appear to be capable of attributing goals to (and subsequently making social evaluations 
of) plain shapes, but have more difficulty with plain pincers. This highlights the 
importance of the agency cues discussed previously. 
 In a second experiment, Hamlin and Wynn (2011) showed 5-month-olds a 
similar scene, but this time a puppet cat was playing with a ball. Again either a helper or 
hinderer entered the scene. In both the helper and hinderer conditions the original puppet 
would roll the ball to the newcomer, then the newcomer would either roll the ball back 
(helping condition) or take the ball and run out of the screen (hindering condition). 
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Again, there was a clear preference for the helper in the puppet condition (10 of 12 
preferring the helper) and less of a preference in the pincer condition (4 of 12 preferring 
the helper).  
 The experiments described thus far from Hamlin and her colleagues demonstrate 
that a preference for helpers over hinderers exists as young as 3 months of age. Hamlin 
and Wynn (2011) furthermore show that this preference is observed across a variety of 
situations, not just the original climbing events. What these experiments have not 
addressed, however, is the age difference observed in Hamlin et al. (2007). That is, these 
experiments corroborate the finding that infants make basic evaluations of “helper” and 
“hinderer,” but they do not investigate whether infants expect others to possess similar 
evaluations.    
 Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, and Mahajan (2011) attempted to address this question 
by altering the methods of Hamlin and Wynn (2011). First, they presented 5- and 8-
month-olds with the exact same box-opening events from the first experiment of Hamlin 
and Wynn (2011): a puppet was either assisted or thwarted by another puppet in trying to 
open a box. Then, instead of being presented with a choice task, the infants were shown 
the ball-rolling events from the second experiment of Hamlin and Wynn (2011). The 
important difference, however, was that the helpers and hinderers from the box-opening 
events were featured as the ball-players. In one condition, new puppets entered and 
either stole the ball or returned it to the helper. In the other condition, new puppets 
entered and either stole the ball or returned it to the hinderer. Using the helper and 
hinderer in both events allowed the infants to evaluate other agents’ reactions to the 
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helper and hinder. The infants were then given a choice test between the Giver and the 
Taker from the ball-rolling events. When the infants saw helping events, they preferred 
the Giver, or the agent who had helped the helper (12 out of 16 5-month-olds and 12 out 
of 16 8-month-olds). When the infants saw hindering events, however, an age difference 
appeared. 8-month-olds preferred the Taker (14 of 16), or the agent who hindered the 
hinderer, while the 5-month-olds preferred the Giver (13 of 16). It appears, that is, that 
the 5-month-olds were only evaluating the specific action (whether it was a helping or 
hindering act), while the 8-month-olds took into account who was being helped or 
hindered. As Hamlin et al. (2011) describe the difference in understanding between 5- 
and 8-month-olds, “the value of a social act is not determined solely by its positive or 
negative effect upon a recipient, but also on that recipient’s own status as a positive or 
negative individual” (p. 19932). 
 These latter results offer a reason to think that a shift in social evaluations takes 
place some time around 8 months. The 8-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) made an 
evaluation of specific acts (helping and hindering), attributed that evaluation to a 
disposition inherent in specific agents (the helper and the hinderer), and used this 
information to form a preference for agents who helped helpers and hindered hinderers. 
8-month-olds who are capable of making this level of social evaluations are presumably 
also capable of performance similar to that of the 9- and 10-month-olds on the looking 
time tasks from Hamlin et al. (2007). Hamlin et al.’s (2011) results demonstrate that 
infants prefer agents who share their perspective (i.e., who help the agents they like and 
hinder the agents they don’t like). This sort of perspective explains the looking time 
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results from Hamlin et al. (2007): from at least 9 months of age, infants expect other 
entities to form social evaluations similar to their own. When other agents fail to act in 
accordance with their presumed evaluations, infants are surprised. The current 
experiment will assess whether Hamlin et al.’s (2011) results with 8-month-olds are 
indeed applicable to the age differences observed in Hamlin et al. (2007). 
Familiarity and Novelty 
 This section will provide a brief justification of looking time tests within Hamlin 
et al.’s (2007) methodology. The main concern stems from computerized versions of the 
climbing events. Wynn (2008) reports an experiment in which 9- and 12-month-olds 
viewed a computerized version of the climbing task, followed by a looking time task in 
which no hill was present. Consistent with Hamlin et al. (2007), both 9- and 12-month-
olds looked longer when the climber approached the hinderer than when it approached 
the helper. However, an earlier computerized version with 5- and 12-month-olds found 
exactly the opposite (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003). Twelve-month-olds looked longer when 
the climber approached the helper than when it approached the hinderer (5-month-olds 
showed no difference). This makes the results difficult to interpret. Kuhlmeier et al. 
(2003) explain their results in terms of a preference for the climber to approach the 
helper while Wynn (2008) reports that longer looking times indicate a violation of 
expectation. This latter interpretation has been favored in all subsequent experiments 
(including Hamlin et al., 2007). 
 Wynn (2008, p. 341) suggests that the difference in results on the looking time 
task was due to the addition of facial features (eyes) to the shapes; the experiment 
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described in Wynn (2008) used facial features, but Kuhlmeier et al. (2003) did not. 
Wynn reasons that the differential results on the looking time test indicates a difference 
in stimuli complexity (and thereby event complexity). Experiments that utilize a 
violation-of-expectation methodology rely upon a well-known distinction in the way 
infants respond to novelty and familiarity: infants respond more to familiarity when 
presented with complex or unfamiliar events, and respond more to novelty when 
presented with familiar or simple events (Hunter and Ames, 1988; Hunter, Ames, and 
Koopman, 1983; Moore & Johnson, 2011; Oakes, 2010). Infants looked longer when the 
climber approached the helper in Kuhlmeier et al. (2003) because the lack of faces 
elicited a preference for familiarity. Infants looked longer when the climber approached 
the hinderer in the experiment reported by Wynn because the presence of faces allowed 
the infants to respond to other aspects of the event—namely, the novelty of the climber 
approaching the hinderer. 
 Though one might wonder whether this adequately explains the observed results, 
the more important question for the current replication is whether the basic idea justifies 
Hamlin et al.’s (2007) looking time measure. Hamlin et al.’s (2007) looking time task is 
different from that of the computerized versions in that the shapes are presented on a 
shallow hill. The climber thus “chooses” one of the shapes against a background similar 
to that of the climbing trials the infants are already familiar with. According to the 
distinction between novelty and familiarity described above, infants should find these 
events highly familiar, and thus be more sensitive to novelty. If infants are truly 
attributing preferences to the climbing shape, this task should be able to detect such 
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attributions. Other agency cues that serve to enhance familiarity, besides eyes, are also 
present in Hamlin et al.’s (2007) task. As will be described in more detail below, the 
climber is made to move in such a way that its “choices” appear more intentional.  
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2.  METHODS 
 The methods of this experiment were intended to be an exact replication of 
Hamlin et al. (2007). The shapes were of slightly different color and shape, and other 
small modifications were made to accommodate a different testing space, but otherwise 
all stimuli and events were identical. Hamlin et al.’s (2007) results create very few 
specific predictions for the performance of 7- and 8-month-olds. It is expected that both 
ages will show a preference for the helper over the hinderer, but there is no reason to 
form specific predictions for either age on the looking time task. 
Participants 
 Thirty infants were recruited for this experiment. The data from three infants 
were excluded due to experimental error. One other infant was excluded because of lack 
of habituation and looking times (explained below) more than three standard deviations 
from the mean. This left 11 7-month-olds and 15 8-month-olds (10 females and 16 
males). 7-month olds ranged from 6 months, 20 days to 7 months, 15 days. 8-month-olds 
ranged from 7 months, 23 days to 8 months, 26 days. No randomization was needed as 
all infants were included in every condition and presentation of trials within each 
condition was counterbalanced. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 For all trials, infants sat on their parent’s lap facing a wooden cubicle 213 cm 
high, 105 cm wide and 43.5 cm deep. The wooden cubicle had an opening 51 cm high 
and 93 cm wide in its front wall. The infant’s head was approximately 78 cm from the 
objects on the platform. The floor and the walls of the apparatus were covered with 
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lightly-patterned contact paper. A muslin-covered shade in the front wall of the 
apparatus was raised to signal the beginning of each trial and lowered at the end of each 
trial, remaining lowered until the beginning of the next trial. To illuminate the stage, four 
20-watt fluorescent bulbs were affixed inside each wall of the apparatus.  
 The display for the familiarization trials was a light pink background with a 
green hill protruding 10 cm. The hill rose from the lower right to the upper left corner of 
the display (41 cm at its highest point). It had a small plateau one-third of the way up 
and a second at the top. There were openings at the top and at the bottom of the hill for 
the characters to enter the display. The characters were wooden blocks with “googly 
eyes” attached to one side and a wooden rod attached to the other (for experimenter 
handling). The circle was 10 cm in diameter and always blue. The square was 9 cm by 
6.5 cm and always purple. The longest side of the triangle was 15 cm, with each of the 
two other sides 7.5 cm, and was always yellow. The shapes were made to appear of 
roughly equal size when placed next to each other against the background. 
 The display for the looking time test contained a shallow symmetrical test hill 
(75 cm long, rising 15 cm from lowest to highest point; light pink background as in 
familiarization trials). The hill was green and the background light pink, just as in the 
familiarization trials.  An all-white piece of foamboard was used for the choice test. 
Events 
 All infants were first presented with an event in which a circle was either helped 
up (by a triangle or square) or pushed down a hill (by whichever shape was not the 
helper). Each shape was a different color that remained constant across trials. The events 
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occurred repeatedly until the infant looked away for 2 consecutive seconds. The 
maximum time for each trial was 60 seconds, with each event taking 12 seconds. 
Whichever event was not shown in the first trial (helper or hinderer) was presented in the 
second trial, following the exact same procedure. This order was counterbalanced across 
six trials such that every infant saw three helper and three hinder trials (six trials total). 
The time each infant spent watching the scene was recorded by two observers. 
 Following the helper and hinderer climbing trials was either the choice test or the 
looking time test (order counterbalanced across all participants). For the looking time 
test, the circle (the climbing agent) sat at the top center of the hill, with the helper and 
hinderer shapes 15 cm away on the bottom right and bottom left. The climber moved 
back and forth (10 cm each way) along the crest of the hill twice, then swayed side-to-
side for 2 seconds at the top center. The climber partially approached, retreated, and then 
fully approached to rest next to the helper or hinderer (on alternating trials). Infants’ 
looking time to the now-stationary characters was then recorded by two observers. Trials 
ended when the infants looked away for 2 consecutive seconds. 
 For the choice test, an experimenter entered behind the apparatus and presented 
the helper and hinderer to the infant on a piece of white foamboard. The helper and 
hinderer were placed 50 cm apart. The experimenter encouraged the infant by asking, 
“Do you want to pick one?” which marked the beginning of the trial. A choice was 
determined by either intentionally touching or picking up the shape. Infants were given 
20 seconds to make a choice. The infants received four choice trials. The infant’s choice 
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was recorded, as was the amount of time they took to make their choice (latency to 
choose). The trial was ended once the infant made a choice. 
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3.  RESULTS 
 The average looking time on the familiarization trials was nearly equal for each 
age group (7-month-olds: M = 43.38s, SD =9.32; 8-month-olds: M = 42.50s, SD = 
12.07; t(24) = .04, p = .843). Difference in looking time on the final trial of the 
familiarization events also failed to reach significance (7-month-olds: M = 27.56, SD = 
12.30; 8-month-olds: M = 26.83s, SD = 18.37; t(24) = .013, p = .911).  
Choice Test 
 The choice data were analyzed with a binomial probability test, following 
Hamlin et al. (2007). Only the infants’ first choice was analyzed, again following 
Hamlin et al. (2007). So, for example, if an infant failed to make a choice on the first 
trial, chose the hinderer on the second trial, and then chose the helper on the third and 
fourth trials, only the choice of the hinderer from the second trial was included in the 
analysis. The 7-month-olds displayed choice behavior similar to that of the 6-month-olds 
in Hamlin et al. (2007), with 11 of 11 7-month-olds choosing the helper (p < .001, one-
tailed). Curiously, the 8-month-olds did not show a clear preference for either agent, 
with 8 of 15 8-month-olds choosing the helper (p = .500). Notwithstanding the 8-month-
old data, overall preference for the helper did reach significance (19 of 26 infants, p = 
.015). 
 No effect was found for gender, order of presentation in the familiarization trials, 
or order of tests. No side or shape preference was observed either. 
 Consistent choice for each age was also calculated, in order to explore further 
differences that might explain the 8-month-old choice data. Seven of 9 7-month-olds 
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chose the same agent twice in a row (two infants made only one choice total; p = .09). 
Among 8-month-olds, only 3 of 12 infants chose the same agent twice in a row (three 
infants made only one choice total; p = 0.073). Although neither of these quite reached 
significance, the relative difference in consistency between 7- and 8-month-olds might 
suggest an age difference in the way the task was processed. Potential implications for 
this will be explored in more detail below. 
 Latency to choose, or the time infants took to make a choice, was analyzed with 
an independent samples t-test. Latency as a function of age was nearly equal (7-month-
olds: M = 8.33s, SD = 6.05; 8-month-olds: M = 8.69s, SD = 6.73; t(23) = -.14, p = .891). 
Latency as a function of choice showed more differentiation, but still did not reach 
significance (Choose Helper: M = 9.24s, SD = 6.60; Choose Hinderer: M = 6.29s, SD = 
5.12; t(23) = .99, p = .328).  
Looking Time Test 
 Following Hamlin et al. (2007), the difference in looking times was analyzed 
with a paired samples t-test for each age group. Four infants did not receive the looking 
time test and were of course not included in the analysis. One other infant was excluded 
because of experimental error.  
 The mean looking times for 7- and 8-month olds were more similar to Hamlin et 
al.’s (2007) 6-month-olds than that of the 10-month-olds, with nearly equal looking 
times to the helper and the hinderer (7-month-olds: Helper M = 16.63s, SD = 11.12; 
Hinderer M = 17.78s, SD = 8.80; t(9) = -.34, p = .75; 8-month-olds: Helper M = 11.72s, 
SD = 4.26; Hinderer M = 10.32s, SD = 6.88; t(10) = .72, p = .49). It is notable that the 7-
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month-olds looked longer at both stimuli, on average, than the 8-month-olds, though 
only the difference when approaching the hinderer reached significance t(19) = 1.362, p 
= .042).  
 A 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the order of 
familiarization trials (helper first or hinderer first), order of test trials (looking time or 
choice), and order of approach (helper or hinderer), with performance on each approach 
of the looking time test as a within-subjects factor. No significant interactions were 
found.    
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4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This replication provides answers to some of the questions raised by Hamlin et 
al. (2007) but also creates a few questions of its own. The 7-month-olds’ preference for 
the helper was consistent with that found with 6- and 10-month-olds in Hamlin et al. 
(2007) and 9-month-olds in Wynn (2008). Curiously, no such preference was found with 
8-month-olds. In fact, 8-month-olds didn’t show a clear preference in either direction. 
The first place to look for an explanation for this would be the looking time test, but the 
results of the looking time test showed that both ages looked equally whether the climber 
approached the helper or the hinderer. Had 8-month-olds shown a preference for the 
helper, the only possible conclusion would be that social evaluations are stable from 6 to 
9 months, but that infants begin to develop a new ability—one related to attributing 
evaluations to other agents—around the 9-month landmark. This experiment does 
support the importance of the 9-month landmark, but the peculiar response of 8-month-
olds creates difficulties for explaining the development of social evaluations from 6 
months on. 
Explaining Unexpected Results 
  One possible explanation for the 8-month-olds’ choice data is that there are 
relevant differences in stimuli complexity between this experiment and Hamlin et al. 
(2007) that prevented the 8-month-olds, but not the 7-month-olds, from forming 
evaluations. These differences, depending on what they might be, could perhaps prevent 
infants from perceiving the agents’ actions as even minimally goal-directed. Indeed, as 
explained earlier, experiments in this line of research have found that stimuli complexity 
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can determine whether approaching the helper is seen as a novel event or familiar event, 
and thus can modify looking times. If a difference in stimuli complexity could be found 
in this experiment, the aberrant 8-month-old data from the choice test could perhaps be 
explained along similar lines.  
 This explanation seems unlikely, however, for a number of reasons. For one, 
there is no reason to think that 7-month-olds would be less sensitive than 8-month-olds 
to any relevant differences. There is no theoretical reason to support an age-difference in 
processing stimuli complexity that applies to 6-, 7-, 9-, and 10-month-olds, but not 8-
month olds. Furthermore, other experiments that have found age-differences pertaining 
to stimuli complexity have placed these differences at younger ages, between 3 and 5 
months (Moore and Johnson, 2011). Finally, unlike the infants reported by Wynn 
(2008), who showed an unexpected preference for the hinderer, the infants in this 
experiment showed no preference. This makes potential differences in stimuli 
explanatorily unhelpful.       
 The difference in choice consistency between 7- and 8-month-olds might be 
taken to support the idea that the difference in choice preferences reflects a difference in 
event processing. The 7-month-olds, all of whom chose the helper, were more likely to 
choose the helper twice in a row. By contrast, the 8-month-olds, who didn’t show a 
strong preference for either the helper or hinderer, were more likely to switch their 
preferences on their second choice. These differences failed to reach significance, 
however, so it remains difficult to interpret these findings.  
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 The fact that 7-month-olds looked longer at both shapes on the looking time test 
than the 8-month-olds could also be taken to suggest an age difference in event 
processing. An obstacle here is that no differences were found in the familiarization 
events. Both ages looked equally during the climbing events, suggesting that they 
processed the events similarly. This excludes the possibility that it was something about 
the apparatus or shapes that could have been more difficult for one age group than the 
other. Perhaps there was something about the looking time events that was processed 
differently according to age, but there’s no reason to think that this impacted the choice 
test.     
 Both of these last two proposals rely on the conjecture that there was some 
nuance of the experimental procedure that was overlooked by 7-month-olds but led to 
confusion among 8-month-olds. It’s not clear what this might be, however, or why only 
8-month-olds would be affected. Of course it may still be the case that an accumulation 
of small differences between this experiment and Hamlin et al. (2007) influenced 
processing, and perhaps the small number of participants is hiding the fact that 7-month-
olds were just as confused as the 8-month-olds. With further testing, perhaps the 7-
month-olds and 8-month-olds would begin to show more compatible preferences. This is 
certainly a possibility, but the current evidence makes it difficult to say whether this is 
likely or not. 
 Finally, these results could be taken as evidence for a U-shaped trajectory in 
social development (Rakison & Yermolayeva, 2011). Nine months is a well-known 
transition period in infancy (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998), so perhaps the 
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period right before this major shift is characterized by a radical alteration in previously 
stable abilities. Though this hypothesis is interesting, the data again fail to provide much 
in the way of assistance. It would have been surprising had 8-month-olds shown a 
preference for the helper as well as increased looking time when the climber approached 
the helper—this would have indicated a reversal of social evaluations between 7- and 9-
months. Neither of these results was observed, however. Rather, 8-month-olds appeared 
to have formed no preferences of their own and did not expect the climbing shape to 
have formed any either. Furthermore, Hamlin et al. (2011) found that 8-month-olds not 
only formed a preference for a helping agent but that they also preferred an agent who 
punished a hindering agent. These results suggest that 8-month-olds are not atypical in 
any way. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that Hamlin et al.’s (2011) puppet show 
may be simpler than the climbing task. Puppets do, after all, possess an abundance of 
agency clues. Even if 8-month-olds formed second-order preferences (to prefer those 
who hinder those they do not like) it may be that the first-order preference is somehow 
more difficult for them. This is at least consistent with the current experiment, and future 
research may benefit from exploring differences in performance starting at around 8 
months. 
Infants’ Understanding of Other Minds 
 An aspect of social evaluation research that has yet to be explored in the 
literature is the potential implications for research on theory of mind. Hamlin et al. 
(2007) and Wynn’s (2008) results showed that 9- and 10-month-olds seem to be capable 
of attributing mental states to another agent. Though the looking time task does not 
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require the representation of another agent’s false beliefs—the sine qua non of theory of 
mind—it does require a comparison between one’s own evaluations and that of another 
agent. Until recently, theory of mind abilities were thought to develop around the age of 
three (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; Clemens & Perner, 1994; Garnham & 
Ruffman, 2001; Siegal & Beattie, 1991). However, a variety of recent studies have 
suggested that these abilities can be seen much earlier, at least by 14 months (Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007) and perhaps as young as 7 months 
(Kovács, Téglás & Endress, 2010). Hamlin et al.’s line of research could be seen as 
contributing to this re-interpretation of the development of theory of mind abilities. The 
results of the looking time test in the current experiment showed that 7- and 8-month-
olds performed like the 6-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2007), looking equally whether 
the climber approached the helper or the hinderer. Thus it can be posited that a new 
ability develops around 9 months of age, one that might be related to theory of mind 
abilities. 
 Two different systems have been proposed to account for recent evidence for 
theory of mind abilities in infancy (Baillargeon, Scott, and He, 2010; Beate, 2011; Luo 
& Baillargeon, 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). The first, subsystem-1 (SS1), is 
responsible for processing others’ goals and dispositions, what other agents have seen 
(and thus what they can know), and generally what reality consists of for other agents 
(Luo and Baillargeon, 2010, p. 304). Hamlin et al.’s (2007) original climbing task has 
been interpreted as pertaining solely to this subsystem (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; 
Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). For example, Hamlin and Wynn (2011) explain the results 
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of the choice test from their puppet events in terms of attributing goals and subsequently 
making social evaluations of those goals. The ability to attribute goals and dispositions is 
an ability possessed by infants as young as 3-month-olds (Luo, 2010), so the social 
climbing task itself probably does not require anything beyond SS1 abilities.  
 The looking time test is what is at issue, however, and here the implications are 
less clear. Subsystem-2 (SS2) has been explicated primarily in relation to false belief 
representation, and thus is somewhat tangential to the attribution of social evaluations. 
SS2 is responsible for tracking whether other agents possess the same knowledge as 
oneself, and representing to an infant any incongruence between reality and what others 
believe about reality (Luo & Baillargeon, 2010). The relevant question, then, is whether 
the looking time task from Hamlin et al. (2007) measures the discrepancy between 
infants’ understanding of their reality and that of the climbing agent.  
 In the looking time test, the infants are expected to apply what they learned from 
the climbing task to a new but not entirely novel task. The climber is moving across a 
shallow hill, but instead of climbing, it is expressing a preference for one agent over the 
other. There is no other obvious goal besides that of moving towards one agent instead 
of another. The reason why this might be thought of as eliciting SS2 is that the looking 
time test is essentially measuring whether the infants expect someone else’s evaluations 
to match their own. The choice test, by contrast, measures whether infants attribute goals 
to the agents and subsequently form social evaluations—these are more explicitly SS1-
related skills. The looking time test measures something in addition to this. Differential 
looking times indicate that infants are comparing their own evaluations with the apparent 
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evaluations of the climbing agent. If the infants hold no expectations with respect to the 
climbing agent, or if they have not processed the climbing task at all, then they will look 
equally long whether the helper or the hinderer is approached.  
 Consider Woodward (1998, described above), a standard depiction of the 
operation of SS1 in infancy. Infants in this task, and many like it, expect that an agent’s 
expressed preference for an object in one context will generalize to all others. The 
obvious difference between a Woodward-type task and the looking time test of Hamlin 
et al. (2007) is that the climbing agent in Hamlin et al. (2007) is not expressing a 
preference for either agent. The tasks the climbing agent has engaged in, as far as the 
infants can tell, have no apparent relevance to showing a preference for anything besides 
reaching the top of a hill. The looking time test is essentially a new task, in which the 
only information relevant to the infants is 1) they (the infants) like the helper, and 2) the 
climbing agent is ostensibly expressing its own preference. The task, considered apart 
from the climbing events, consists of a similar assessment as that of Woodward-type 
tasks. The challenge facing the infant, however, when considering the transition from the 
climbing events to the looking time test, consists of a comparison between the infants’ 
previous evaluations and the expectations they have of the climbing agent. One way of 
explaining performance on this task is to say that older infants show a difference in 
looking time because they compare their representation of reality to that of the climbing 
agent and see no reason why the climber’s preference should diverge from theirs. 
Younger infants conduct no comparison because they lack theory of mind abilities, and 
so do not form any expectations. 
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 An additional consideration for why performance on the looking time task should 
be seen as relevant to theory of mind can be gleaned from Hamlin et al. (2011). As 
described previously, they found an age difference between 5- and 8-month-olds on the 
ability to make second-order social evaluations. 8-month-olds not only preferred the 
helper, they also preferred those who helped the helper or hindered the hinderer. Five-
month-olds, by comparison, were only capable of making the initial evaluation of helper 
over hinderer. Aside from making the present choice data appear abnormal, these results 
also suggest that 8-month-olds possess sophisticated abilities related to theory of mind. 
They understand not only that something can be good or bad, but also that others will 
evaluate agents as good or bad. The ability to make these attributions to other agents 
furthermore entails the expectation that others will treat good and bad agents in certain 
ways.  
 Both 5- and 8-month-olds are well within the proposed time range for SS1, so it’s 
odd to see such a striking age-difference in ability in these experiments. This leaves two 
possibilities: 1) 8-month-olds have simply acquired more social knowledge than 5-
month-olds, or 2) they have acquired abilities pertaining to theory of mind, consistent 
with other studies showing that these abilities develop around 7 months of age. 8-month-
olds in the current experiment of course failed to show a preference for the helper, which 
suggests that they would be unable to form a second-order preference as the 8-month-
olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) did. Though this is puzzling, for the sake of analysis the 
more pertinent question is whether the 9-month-olds’ performance on the looking time 
task from Hamlin et al. (2007) and the 8-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) should be 
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considered a result of increased social knowledge or newly developed theory of mind 
abilities.  
 The social knowledge hypothesis has some plausibility. That there is a 
specifically social domain that arises early in development was first proposed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Smetana, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1977, 1978, 1983; recent 
extensions of this include Bugental, 2000 and Grusec & Davidov, 2010). More recently, 
it has been proposed that social knowledge arises sufficiently early in development and 
provides a foundation for so many other abilities that it should be considered a “core 
knowledge system,” on par with knowledge of objects, actions, number, and space 
(Spelke, 1990; Carey & Spelke, 1994; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). To extrapolate, just as 
knowledge about the solidity and cohesion of objects is central to physical reasoning 
(Baillargeon & Carey, in press), perhaps an understanding of action valence (good or 
bad) and preference formation is central to social evaluation. This would lend priority to 
a social knowledge explanation for performance on the looking time test, as core 
knowledge systems are thought to be largely innate, and would thus be available prior to 
the development of theory of mind abilities. 
 Although the social knowledge hypothesis helps explain the early development 
of social evaluations, it doesn’t appear to be able to account for the age-difference in 
Hamlin et al.’s (2007) looking time test. As argued above, the looking time test seems to 
require additional mental abilities. Proposed features of an early developing core system 
of social knowledge have been limited primarily to the ability to recognize members of 
one’s social group (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). We might add to this the ability to attribute 
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goals, dispositions, and to act prosocially. However, none of these skills account for the 
ability to attribute preferences to other agents, and to compare these preferences to one’s 
own. Assuming that it is true that social knowledge develops early in infancy, it appears 
that this ability remains relatively stable up until 8 or 9 months of age, and then is 
supplemented by newly developed theory of mind abilities. This is what contributes to 
the production of the types of attributions shown in the looking time test.  
Conclusion 
 One key result from this experiment was that the 7- and 8-month-olds performed 
more like the 6-month-olds than the 10-month-olds in Hamlin et al.’s (2007) looking 
time test.  Other questions were raised by the choice test results, but these looking time 
data do assist in resolving the initial question of what develops after 6 months. The 
considerations of this last section further suggest that future investigations of social 
evaluation in infancy might benefit from pitting hypotheses related to social knowledge 
against hypotheses related to theory of mind. If theory of mind abilities originate around 
7 months, it may be theory of mind mechanisms, and not social knowledge, that require 
further illumination. 
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